How to Improve Global Mineral Governance by Hasrul Hanif

The race to secure critical minerals has intensified at the same time as the international community recognizes the need for more sustainable and responsible mining practices. Translating the resulting framework and guidelines into concrete action requires bringing together the Global South’s policy and advocacy networks.

YOGYAKARTA—Interdependence may be the theme of the annual meeting of the Intergovernmental Forum on Mining, Minerals, Metals and Sustainable Development (IGF), held in Geneva on October 12–14, but the competition between countries to secure transition minerals remains fierce. This scramble can have adverse consequences for mineral-producing countries if it undermines sustainability standards and prevents equitable sharing of costs and benefits between and within countries.

The International Energy Agency estimates that, to achieve net-zero emissions, the demand for critical minerals will triple by 2030 and quadruple by 2040. Mineral-rich countries, aware of the “resource curse,” are looking for ways to control their reserves. In an effort to promote domestic value addition and achieve economic development goals, many of these countries are seeking to ban exports of critical raw materials.

But Indonesia’s experience as one of the first countries to implement such a ban shows that downstream industrialization is not a cure-all. It can come with substantial environmental and social costs, and the benefits are not always equitably shared with local communities who often bear the greatest burden of extraction and processing. And while extraction, smelting, and processing have boosted economic growth in Indonesia’s three nickel-rich provinces, they have not made a significant contribution to the national economy. Frontier-making—the act of turning marginal areas into centers of resource extraction—can create new “sacrifice zones” when not accompanied by strong regulation and democratic oversight.

Meanwhile, the emphasis on sustainable mining has never been greater at the global level. In 2024, the United Nations Secretary-General’s Panel on Critical Energy Transition Minerals published a set of guiding principles that emphasized the need for a new paradigm based on justice and equity, and for mining to benefit host countries and local communities. Regional frameworks, including the African Union’s African Mining Vision, follow-up guidelines and frameworks, and the ASEAN Principles for Sustainable Mineral Development, reflect similar commitments.

However, the agreement was sidelined, as countries sought bilateral agreements that prioritized market access above all else. Consider the uneven treatment of nickel and palm oil in the EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement. The European Union has strict sustainability standards for palm oil, but not for nickel, even though both sectors can cause significant social and environmental degradation.

The best way to implement the principles is to integrate the policies and advocacy networks of the Global South. It will allow policy makers, civil society, and local communities to share their experiences on mineral extraction and processing and proposals to make the sector more equitable and environmentally responsible.

There is a genuine desire among policymakers in the Global South to share lessons learned from successes and failures. The South–South Transition Minerals Learning Platform of the Natural Resource Governance Institute has facilitated the dissemination of policy insights among government officials from Indonesia, Chile, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and other countries. While they have the same goal – to build a more inclusive, resilient, and prosperous society using mineral wealth – the platform allows a deeper understanding of how commodity variations, domestic political economies, and value chain positions require different strategies, rather than a one-size-fits-all approach.

Equally important are the transnational or transcalar advocacy networks that connect civil society groups in the Global South. They can also provide a platform to share experiences and knowledge, as well as strengthen collective action and extend accountability beyond national borders. By producing substantial evidence of social and environmental violations related to the extraction, smelting, and processing of minerals, domestic advocacy actors can bypass governments and companies that do not support local communities and directly seek international allies to apply external pressure.

Here again, Indonesia provides a useful example. Indonesia’s famous NGO WALHI, together with Friends of the Earth Japan, mobilized more than a hundred organizations to urge Vale Indonesia’s shareholders to act on allegations of human rights violations in the Sorowako nickel project. Some shareholders, including Vale, Sumitomo Metal Mining, and Mitsui & Co., responded by putting pressure on the company when the government failed to act effectively.

In addition, campaigners from Mighty Earth, Climate Rights International, and Global Witness have drawn attention to investors by exposing the abuse of nickel in Indonesia’s nickel extraction and processing industry. He called on battery and electric car manufacturers to comply with social and environmental standards and due diligence obligations. Weda Bay Nickel has since expressed interest in meeting the Initiative for Responsible Mining Assurance standards, and several automakers have imposed stricter requirements on nickel suppliers.

This global pressure—which includes Indonesia’s Publish What You Pay raising concerns about the country’s handling of nickel at the 2025 OECD Forum on Responsible Mineral Supply Chains—has put pressure on the Indonesian government. After evaluating the gap between the regulatory framework and the three global standards, the government prepared ESG (environmental, social, and governance) guidelines to help companies identify Indonesian regulations that meet the requirements of global standards in the nickel supply chain.

Advancing inclusion in the supply chain of transition minerals—the goal of the IGF meeting—requires a strategy to translate lofty declarations into concrete action. This can be achieved by consolidating and strengthening Global South policy and advocacy networks. Existing South-South cooperation mechanisms can expand their reach to facilitate policy studies on critical minerals, while domestic civil society groups can expand global linkages to shine a light on mining-related environmental damage and human rights abuses. Many pieces of the puzzle are already there; now it’s time to put it together.